Personal Injury Awards

SUCCESSFUL CIVIL JURY VERDICTS AND SETTLEMENTS OBTAINED BY RANDOLPH H. WOLF

The following are copies of articles published in the New Jersey Jury Verdict Review for recoveries obtained by Mr. Wolf. The articles are copyrighted by the New Jersey Verdict Review and are reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

$1,000,000 RECOVERY - PRODUCTS LIABILITY - IGNITION WHILE CLEANING ELECTROSTATIC SPRAY PAINTER - SEVERE BURNS TO ARMS, CHEST, BACK AND LEGS.

Monmouth County

This was a products liability action in which the male plaintiff in his 50's, who was standing next to a co-worker who was cleaning an industrial electrostatic spray painter by flushing solvent through the hose into a bucket in a sink, contended that the spray painting device was defective. The plaintiff contended that the equipment should have contained an interlock which would prevent it from being cleaned if the high voltage component of the power supply, which was used in the spray painting of metal, was inadvertently activated during the cleaning process. The plaintiff contended that the high voltage component resulted in the build up of the "electrical potential" which caused a spark which in turn ignited solvent vapors that had built up in the area of the sink. The plaintiff further contended that warnings supplied by the equipment manufacturer were inadequate. The plaintiff contended that he sustained third degree burns over 39% of his body including the arms, chest back and legs. The evidence disclosed that the electrostatic paint equipment is often used to paint metal and that it comes equipped with a high voltage component which facilitates even coating on metal. The investigating police officer had determined that the high voltage power source was activated when he inspected the device after accident. The plaintiff's expert engineer contended that the use of the high voltage power supply when using the solvent was dangerous because the solvent was more likely to build-up an electrical charge which could result in a spark and fire. The expert contended that the machine should have had an interlock to prevent the high voltage power supply from operating while the machine was being cleaned. The defendant denied that the product was defective or that such an interlock was necessary. The defendant further contended that the warnings were adequate. The plaintiff maintained that the warnings on the machine were not sufficiently clear and were not placed in a conspicuous location. The defendant further contended that it had offered a training program and that the employer failed to have the plaintiff and co-employee take part in this program. The plaintiff countered that if such a course was necessary, the defendant should have placed warnings on the equipment that uncertified persons should not be permitted to use the machine. The plaintiff also contended that the machine could have been rendered much safer without undue cost by providing an interlock and that in view of the failure of the defendant to do so, its reliance on warnings should not be accepted. The plaintiff suffered third degree burns over 39% of his body, including the arms, chest, back and legs. The plaintiff contended that he required a one month hospitalization during which he underwent regular debridements. The plaintiff maintained that the procedures were painful despite the use of painkilling medication. The plaintiff related that he missed approximately one year from work. The plaintiff contended that the permanent scarring is particularly severe and that it is clearly permanent in nature. The plaintiff also contended that the skin has a mottled and puckered appearance. The plaintiff maintained that he will suffer relatively minor restriction of motion in the non-dominant arm permanently. The plaintiff contended that he suffered a very significant post- traumatic depression and required some months of psychotherapy. This condition essentially resolved. The plaintiff is married. The case settled prior to trial for a total of $1,000,000. The defendant paint sprayer manufacturer had contributed $700,000. The plaintiff had also contended that the solvent itself was defective because of mislabeling which reflected that the solvent was "combustible," rather than "flammable." The plaintiff contended that the solvent was, in fact, flammable which reflected that it had a lower flash point and that flammable products would not be appropriate for use when cleaning the paint sprayer. The defendant solvent manufacturer contributed $150,000. Finally, the plaintiff had also named the renter of the industrial uniform, contending that the combination of cotton and polyester of which uniform was made was susceptible to melting as it burned and that cotton, which would not melt and which comprised the plaintiff's pants, would be less dangerous. This defendant contributed $150,000.

REFERENCE

Plaintiff's electrical engineer: Theodore Fishman from Rye Brook, N.Y. Plaintiff's fire safety engineer: David Demers from Lunenburg, Ma. Plaintiff's human factors/warnings expert: Robert Cunitz from Rockville, Md. Plaintiff's burn specialist: Sylvia Petrone from St. Barnabus Hospital in Livingston. Plaintiff's psychologist: Richard Irlando from Livingston.

Levine vs. Binks Mfr. Co., et al. Docket no. L-1332-93; Judge Robert Feldman, 6-3-97.

Attorney for plaintiff: Randolph H. Wolf.

COMMENTARY

The defendant had contended that the warnings were adequate and further stressed that it had offered a safety program to the employer which trained workers to avoid dangers. The plaintiff, who would have argued that the warnings were not sufficiently clear or conspicuously placed, would also have endeavored to undermine the defendant's case by arguing that the defendant should have taken greater steps to ensure participation in the training program such as placing warnings on the machine that uncertified individuals should not use it. Moreover, the plaintiff would have strenuously argued that the hazard could have been easily and effectively prevented through the use of an interlock which would prevent the equipment from being cleaned through flushing solvent through the system when the high voltage component was activated. In this regard, the plaintiff would have argued that since the defendant could, as a practical matter, have readily made the equipment much safer, obviating the need to solely rely on warnings, the safety program and/or warnings provided should not relieve the defendant of liability. Regarding damages, the plaintiff would have argued damages in a low key manner, preferring to permit the severe scarring from the burn injuries to speak for themselves. Additionally, the plaintiff, who would have briefly shown the actual scars to the jury, had also planned on introducing the photographs without initially having them passed among the jury members, permitting them to view the photographs for the first time during deliberations, thereby endeavoring to minimize the chances of the effect of the photographs being diluted by repeated observations. Finally, as has often been noted, traumatic incidents such as the ignition which occurred in this case leading to extensive burn injuries can often create a very strong jury response.

$500,000 RECOVERY - 70-YEAR-OLD RETIRED DECEDENT/PEDESTRIAN STRUCK AND KILLED BY DEFENDANT DRIVER TURNING RIGHT ON RED WITHOUT MAKING SUFFICIENT OBSERVATIONS AT INTERSECTION WHERE SUCH TURNS ARE OTHERWISE PERMISSIBLE - LACK OF EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT PAIN AND SUFFERING - DECEDENT LEFT DISABLED WIDOW SUFFERING PARAPLEGIA AND SEVERE RELATED PSYCHIATRIC DEPRESSION.

Monmouth County

In this action, the plaintiff contended that the defendant driver negligently failed to make observations before making a right turn on a red light at an intersection in which such turns would otherwise be permissible. The plaintiff contended that as a result, the 70-year old pedestrian was struck, sustaining a closed head trauma, subdural hematoma and subarachnoid hemorrhage which took his life several hours later. The decedent was retired. He left a wife who was rendered a paraplegic some ten years earlier in an accident, was suffering suffered a long term psychiatric depression that was related to the physical disability , and the plaintiff contended that the loss of services, guidance and advice that was occasioned by the death, was very significant.

The plaintiff contended that after taking a few steps from the curb with a green light, the defendant turned right on red and struck him. The plaintiff elicited testimony from the defendant during discovery that after looking to his left and right one time, and then looking to his left again, the he proceeded to turn right without making additional observations. The accident occurred on Rt. 35, the defendant pointed out that no crosswalk was present and maintained that in view of the busy nature of the highway, the decedent should have walked to a nearby intersection that contained a crosswalk where he could cross more safely.

The decedent was knocked to the ground and struck his head. The plaintiff contended that although the decedent initially appeared to avoid severe injuries, a Cat Scan taken at the hospital revealed a subdural hematoma and subarachnoid hemorrhage. The decedent died a short time later and the hospital records did not reflect severe pain and suffering.

The plaintiff maintained that although the decedent was retired, the death occasioned very significant economic losses. The evidence disclosed that approximately 10 years earlier, the widow had been rendered a paraplegic in an accident. The plaintiff also maintained that the widow had also suffered a severe psychiatric depression that was related to her physical disability and which necessitated psychiatric treatment . The plaintiff contended that the decedent provided extensive services, as well as guidance and advice to the widow. The plaintiff contended that the decedent cooked meals for his wife, regularly bathed her and kept care of the home. The plaintiff also contended that in addition to the household services that the plaintiff contended were analogous to the services provided by a home health aide, the decedent also provided the services of an LPN in administering medication to his wife on a daily basis. The plaintiff's economist would have testified that the replacement value of the home health aide services was $931,000 and the replacement value of an LPN was $251,000.

The defendant would have pointed out that the widow's niece has been providing such help since the time of the death and the plaintiff would have countered that the niece is under no obligation to do so, and even though she was caring enough to help during the pendency of the litigation, such care might well cease after the completion of the case, especially since the niece has her own family.

The case settled prior to trial for $500,000.

Plaintiff's economist: Richard Ruth

Yan vs. Marszalek, et al. Docket no L-5502-99 Judge Robert Feldman

Attorney for plaintiff: Randolph H. Wolf of Red Bank.

COMMENTARY: The plaintiff obtained a very substantial recovery in this death action in light of the fact that the 70-year-old decedent was retired and in view of fact that the evidence reflected relatively minimal pain and suffering until the decedent died several hours after the accident. The plaintiff, who emphasized that the decedent had been the primary care giver to his wife who was a paraplegic and who suffered a very significant psychiatric depression, would have presented, through his expert economist, evidence of the cost of replacement value of services to this widow which exceeded $1.1 mil.
In this regard, it is felt that although it is often advantageous for a plaintiff to permit the jury to use its common knowledge and experience to evaluate such Green/Bitner type damages which are presented in addition to losses stemming from lost income and evidence of conscious pain and suffering, the ability of the plaintiff's expert to quantify specific elements of such losses in this type of case provided very strong leverage to the plaintiff during negotiations.

$55,000 RECOVERY - Products Liability - Alleged defective design of bead cleaning machine used to wash small beads that are used in hospital setting to absorb waste - Beads fall from cleaning machine - Slip and fall - Torn meniscus.

Monmouth County

The male plaintiff in his 30's, who worked for a company utilizing a machine to clean small silicone beads which are used to absorb waste material in a hospital setting, contended that the machine was defectively designed because it was equipped with only a rubber, rather than a metal seal, resulting in its failing to adequately contain the beads. The plaintiff maintained that he slipped and fell, suffering a tear of the medical meniscus. The defendant contended that the machine was properly designed. The defendant further contended that the plaintiff's employer had final control over the design of the machine. The plaintiff maintained that he required arthroscopic surgery and will suffer permanent pain and restrictions of his activities. The plaintiff was able to return to his job. The case settled prior to trial for $55,000.

REFERENCE

Plaintiff's expert engineer: Roger Singer from NYC. Plaintiff's orthopedist: Peter Allegra from Red Bank.

Rivera vs. Control Systems. Docket no. L-2871-94; Judge Louis Locascio, 6-97.

Attorney for plaintiff: Randolph Wolf.

$50,000 RECOVERY - Failure to place steps at convenient area between strip mall parking lot and mall roadway - Fractured ankle - Defendant contends plaintiff ignored walkway and cut across grassy area.

Monmouth County

The female plaintiff in her mid-50's contended that the only stairway present at the defendant's mall was a very significant distance away from the store where she exited and that individuals often used the grassy area to cross down to the parking lot. The plaintiff contended that the defendant strip mall owner should have placed a centrally located walkway and stairway with a hand rail. The plaintiff maintained that as a result, she slipped while walking down the grass suffering a fractured ankle.

The defendant contended that a stairway was located only 30 feet away and that the plaintiff negligently failed to use it. The plaintiff contended that she lost her footing and fell, suffering a trimalleolar fracture which required an open reduction and internal fixation. The plaintiff's orthopedist had determined that the plaintiff made a good recovery and would suffer minor limitation of motion only. The case settled prior to trial for $50,000.

REFERENCE

Plaintiff's expert engineer: William Poznak from Oakhurst.

Campi vs. Eastpoint Mall. Docket no. L-5114-93; 6-20-97.

Attorney for plaintiff: Randolph Wolf.

$35,000 VERDICT - Tort Claims Case - Hard dirt surface under recreational device - Child falls approximately five feet and fractures dominant shoulder.

Monmouth County

The plaintiff, age eight or nine at the time, who went to the park to play tennis, contended that when she observed that the courts were in use, she started to play on a monkey bar situated next to the courts. The plaintiff lost her grip and fell approximately five feet, striking the ground. The plaintiff's recreational expert maintained that the ground underneath the equipment was dangerous because it was compact and hardened. The expert contended that the defendant should have placed sand, mulch or tree bark to create a cushion and the plaintiff contended that the failure to do so was palpably unreasonable.

The defendant contended that the equipment was not meant to be used by children and was, in fact, a chin up bar designed to be used by adults for exercise only and that the area was not dangerous. The plaintiff countered that there were no warnings or advisements that only adults should use the equipment. The plaintiff's orthopedist related that the plaintiff suffered a fracture to the dominant shoulder which was treated by way of closed reduction under general anesthesia. The expert contended that the plaintiff will permanently suffer a slight cosmetic slope in the shoulder which renders it difficult to wear a bathing suit or evening gowns. The physician also contended that the plaintiff will permanently suffer some weakness in the shoulder.

The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $35,000.

REFERENCE

Plaintiff's safety expert: Neil Dougherty from Rutgers Univ. Plaintiff's orthopedist: Robert Greisman from Middletown.

Rumola vs. Twp of Middletown. Docket no. L-54486-89; Judge Raymond Hayser, 11-10-93.

Attorney for plaintiff: Randolph H. Wolf; Attorney for defendant: Bernard Reilly.

$28,000 GROSS VERDICT - Absence of railing or yellow markings at walkway step-down situated on commercial premises - Fall - Ligamental tear to dominant wrist - Carpal tunnel syndrome.

Monmouth County

The female plaintiff age approximately 70, who was visiting her dentist, contended that the walkway, which contained a step-down in the area the walkway turned to the right at the end of the building, was dangerous because of the absence of either a yellow marker delineating the step-down or a railing. The plaintiff's expert engineer maintained that the step-down should have contained either a railing, or appropriate warnings. The defendant contended that the area was safe. The defendant also contended that the plaintiff, who had been to the building numerous times in the past, was comparatively negligent at the time of the daylight accident. The plaintiff countered that she walked through this area only because she was forced to park in the back by the absence of spaces in the front lot and that she had always parked in front of the building and taken a different route on the prior occasions.

The plaintiff's orthopedist contended that the plaintiff suffered a severe tear to the ligaments in the dominant wrist and carpal tunnel syndrome. The physician indicated that although the carpal tunnel injury could probably resolve with surgery, the ligamental tear would cause significant symptoms even if an operation were performed. The physician contended that the plaintiff will permanently suffer pain and weakness. The plaintiff maintained that she has great difficulties performing everyday tasks such as housework. The plaintiff's orthopedist also contended that traumatic arthritis is likely. The defendant's orthopedist found no signs of abnormalities. The jury

found the defendant 65% negligent, the plaintiff 35% comparatively negligent and awarded $25,000 to the plaintiff and $3,000 to her husband which were molded accordingly.

REFERENCE

Plaintiff's engineer: William Poznak from Oakhurst. Plaintiff's orthopedist: Harry Bade from Little Silver. Defendant's orthopedist: Leonard Genova from Middletown.

Maffei vs. West Park Condo Assoc. Docket no L-53368-89; Judge Robert W. O'Hagan, 5-6-93.

Attorney for plaintiff: Randolph H. Wolf; Attorney for defendant: Martin McGowan.

$500,000 VERDICT - PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE - NURSING MALPRACTICE - FAILURE OF PSYCHIATRIST TO ASCERTAIN THAT TREATMENT AFFORDED TO SUICIDAL DEPRESSION PATIENT WAS INEFFECTUAL - NEGLIGENT FAILURE OF NURSES TO ADMINISTER PRESCRIBED DOSAGES OF MEDICATION - WRONGFUL DEATH OF HOUSEMOTHER.

Monmouth County

This was a psychiatric malpractice action in which the plaintiff contended that the 33 year old decedent's death from suicide was occasioned by the negligence of the defendant psychiatrist with privileges at a hospital with a psychiatric care unit, who discharged the decedent when she was obviously suicidal and who failed to take steps to ensure that the patient was being provided with the prescribed dosages of her medication. The plaintiff further contended that the defendant psychiatrist failed to ascertain that the nurses were not providing the prescribed dosages of the medication. The plaintiff further contended that several defendant nurses in the employ of the defendant hospital negligently failed to administer the prescribed dosages of the medication and negligently failed to properly coordinate with the lab performing blood work on the plaintiff, thereby failing to ascertain that proper levels were not being administered. Finally, the plaintiff contended that the defendant nurses improperly engaged in incitive rather than supportive psychotherapy, which is a type of therapy for which they were allegedly not trained or competent to engage in. The decedent committed suicide by hanging herself several hours after she was discharged. The decedent, who did not have a longstanding history of depression, had fallen into a depression shortly before she was admitted to the hospital and a diagnosis of acute psychotic depression was made shortly thereafter. The defendant psychiatrist prescribed the anti- depressant drug Desyrel and the plaintiff's expert maintained that this particular medication was not the drug of choice for patients suffering from a psychotic depression. The expert indicated that although the initial use of the drug was not, in and of itself, a deviation, the defendant should have, based upon records which were replete with mentions of an absence of an improvement during the 6 week hospital stay, initially taken steps to ascertain whether the plaintiff was receiving therapeutic levels of the drug. The plaintiff's expert related that two blood tests taken in the hospital revealed that the plaintiff had only 1/10 of the level of Desyrel in her blood that would have been expected if the prescribed dosages had been administered and the expert contended that these results reflected that the plaintiff was receiving far less than the dosages prescribed which would be necessary for effective treatment. The expert maintained that although the medication prescribed was not the drug of choice, the proper amounts would have afforded the plaintiff some improvement and that the defendant deviated in failing to ascertain that the prescribed levels were not being administered by the co-defendant nurses. The expert alternatively maintained that when no improvement was evident, the defendant psychiatrist should have changed the drug to a Trygliceric anti-depressant medication which, according to the expert, is generally known to be more effective with deep depression in general, and psychotic depression in particular. The plaintiff's nursing expert maintained that based upon the levels of the medication in the blood, it was obvious that the nurses were not administering the prescribed dosages. The nursing expert further contended that a nurse should only become engaged in supportive type therapy, which would entail discussing subjects only after the patient brought the particular subject up, and not engage in affirmative incitive type therapy in which the nurses would bring up subjects for discussion in an attempt to ascertain and deal with the patient's particular problems. The expert maintained that such therapy by any individual, trained or otherwise, was inappropriate for this patient because she had paranoid and psychotic thoughts and as such, was not medically ready for such therapy.

The defendant psychiatrist and her expert psychiatrist each maintained that the decedent had enjoyed significant improvement and that the decision to discharge her was proper. The plaintiff countered through the introduction of records indicating that the decedent was delusional and had suicidal ideation throughout her hospital stay and the plaintiff's expert maintained that in view of the absence of any improvement, the decision to discharge the decedent was improper. The defendant's expert contended that it is impossible to predict that an individual is planning suicide. The plaintiff's expert countered that the decedent exhibited clear indicators which should have led the defendant to realize that suicide was imminent. According to the expert, the records were replete with mentions of the decedent's feelings of hopelessness and of suicidal thoughts and the expert contended that the records reflected an absence in improvement throughout the hospital stay. The expert further maintained that the two brothers of the decedent had committed suicide and that such an event is an additional indicator of suicide which should have prompted the defendant to ascertain that a discharge at that time would have been dangerous. The defendant conceded during cross-examination that the hereditary factor must be considered in evaluating the course of treatment and that this type of patient requires "special treatment." The plaintiff argued that since the defendant did not contend that such special treatment was afforded, it was obvious that the defendant had deviated. The plaintiff's expert maintained that studies have established that a high percentage of patients such as the decedent, who were suffering from acute rather than chronic depression, enjoy a relatively complete cure if proper treatment and medication is afforded and the expert contended that if such proper care was provided, the decedent would probably have never committed suicide and probably would have recovered fully. The decedent, who did not work outside of the home, left a husband and two children, aged 11 and 14 at the time of the suicide. The plaintiff contended that prior to the onset of the acute depression, the decedent provided significant guidance and advice and that if proper care would have been provided, she would have been able to resume providing these extensive services. The jury found against the defendant psychiatrist, found against 3 defendant nurses, exonerated the remaining two nurses, who according to the records, played a limited role only in the treatment of the decedent. The jury then awarded $500,000.

REFERENCE

Plaintiff's expert psychiatrist: Donald Klein, Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia University. Plaintiff's nursing expert: Maureen Walstedter, Professor of nursing at Middlesex County College. Plaintiff's economist: Richard Ruth from Summit. Defendant's expert psychiatrist: Harvey Hammer from Morristown Memorial. Docket no. L-027598-84; Judge William Wichman, 1-23-86. Attorneys for plaintiff: Harold J. Cassidy and Randolph H. Wolf; Attorney for defendant psychiatrist: Thomas Alworth; Attorney for defendant hospital and all nurses but one: Joseph Cooney; Attorney for remaining defendant nurse: John Duggan.

COMMENTARY

The plaintiff, who was confronted with the classical defense that suicide is impossible to predict, utilized a renowned psychiatric expert who has published widely in the field, who effectively utilized the defendants' own records to detail certain indicators which, according to the expert, should have alerted the defendant psychiatrist to the imminent probability that the decedent would have committed the act if released. Specifically, the expert pointed to continuing feelings of hopelessness and suicidal ideation as mentioned in the records, as well as a close family history of suicide, which according to the plaintiff's expert, would greatly assist in predicting the chances of the decedent's committing suicide if the depression was not properly treated. Additionally, the plaintiff elicited concessions from the defendant herself that the individuals with a family history of suicide require special treatment and that the illness of major depression is the leading cause of death in the field of psychiatry, enabling the plaintiff to argue that based upon this testimony, it was foreseeable that if the decedent was not properly treated, she would be likely to commit the act. The plaintiff had further contended that the medication initially prescribed was not the drug of choice and that although the use of such medication did not, in and of itself, constitute a deviation, the defendant psychiatrist negligently failed to ascertain that the proper amounts of this medication were not actually being administered and that as a result, the medication had little if any effect. The plaintiff's expert utilized the results of the blood test which indicated that the decedent had approximately 1/10th of the level of the drug as she would have had if the prescribed amounts were administered to lend significant support for the plaintiff's contention that the defendant psychiatrist failed to properly monitor the patient and that the nurses failed to properly administer the prescribed dosages. Regarding damages, the decedent was a housewife who did not work outside the home and the plaintiff was confronted with the practical burden of establishing that the severely depressed decedent would have provided extensive guidance and advice to her family if the defendants had not deviated. The plaintiff's expert had maintained that patients suffering from acute, rather than longstanding depression, generally enjoy a substantial resolution of the depression if proper care is provided and the plaintiff offered substantial evidence of extensive guidance and advice provided by the decedent before she fell into the depression, effectively arguing that it was highly likely that if such satisfactory treatment had been afforded, the decedent would have resumed her productive role as homemaker.